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Abstract Codes of good practices provide a soft alternative to the hard legislation 
approach to corporate governance. These codes include a set of recommendations 
that companies are expected to follow in order to enhance governance structures and 
practices. Some of these recommendations specifically aim to improve the effective- 
ness of the audit committee. We investigate the relationship between the level of 
compliance with recommendations on the audit committee of the Spanish Unified 
Code and financial reporting quality, as measured by discretionary accruals and by 
the opinion of the audit report. We  use a sample of companies listed in the Span-  ish 
stock market for the years between 2007 and 2013. Results show a strong and positive 
relationship between the level of compliance with recommendations and the quality 
of financial reporting. We also report significant results for some specific 
recommendations. These results are robust to various checks. Therefore, the level of 
compliance with recommendations on the audit committee might provide a feasible 
and reliable indicator of the quality of financial reports released by the company. 
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The Enron case and other financial scandals at the beginning of this century caused a 
great concern among regulators and policy-makers about the necessity of new 
regulations to prevent, or at least to make it difficult, such cases to repeat. A com- 
mon feature of these scandals was that the accounting information released by the 
companies did not reflect the current economic and financial situation. Thus, market 
participants who made investment decisions on the basis of this information were 
being tricked by managers, the ultimate responsible of the accounting information 
produced and released by the company. 
As posed by Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra (2009), loss of confidence in account- 
ing information, caused by these corporate scandals, favoured an increasing demand 
for sounder corporate governance structures and practices. They argued that the 
reaction of regulators to these demands has been twofold. On the one hand, through 
the approval of “hard legislation”, such as the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (hereinafter  SOX 
Act1) aiming to improve governance practices which should ultimately lead   to 
higher accounting quality. On the other hand, and usually complementing this hard 
approach, the approval and endorsement of codes of good practices (hereinaf- ter, 
CGP) has been a “soft legislation” reaction to the demand of better governance. These 
codes constitute non-binding set of principles, standards or best practices, issued by 
a collective body, and relating to the internal governance of corporations (Weil and 
Manges 2002). 
Both hard and soft legislation approaches emphasize the role of the audit commit- 
tee in guaranteeing the quality of accounting information. DeFond & Zhang   (2014, 
306) argued that a major consequence of the SOX Act was to raise public awareness 
of the role auditing plays in effective corporate governance. The most visible sign of 
this upgrade in the status of the auditing profession being the mandated changes to 
the audit committee. These changes attempted to increase the demand for audit qual- 
ity by improving client governance. A number of studies have investigated whether 
financial reporting quality has improved as a result of these requirements (e.g. Klein 
2002, Abbott et al. 2004 and more recently, De Vlaminck & Sarens 2015). As for the 
soft legislation approach, CGP generally include a bunch of recommendations on the 
audit committee. As an example, the Spanish 2006 Unified Good Governance Code 
of Listed Companies (hereinafter “Unified Code”) (CNMV 2006) included eight 





1 The Law contains numerous measures aiming to enhance the quality of  accounting  information. Among 
others: CEO and chief financial officer must certify financial statements; all audit commit-       tee members 





the 2015 reform of the Unified Code (CNMV 2015) further expands the powers of 
the audit committee and it also establishes new requirements. 
The motivation of this study lies on the growing importance of corporate gov- 
ernance issues not only among scholars on management, but also for  regulators   and 
policy makers. This situation has led, among other things, to the approval and 
endorsement of CGP in many countries. An area of particular concern is the quality 
of the financial information produced and released by corporations. If the level of 
compliance with CGP recommendations effectively indicates stronger governance 
mechanisms and structures, investors, market participants and any potential stake- 
holder might use this easily accessible information as an indicator of the quality of a 
company’s governance. Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, no study to date 
has examined to what extent, compliance with the recommendations of CGP is in fact 
associated with higher financial reporting quality. We aim to contribute not only to 
the literature but also to corporate governance practice by addressing this gap. With 
this goal, we investigate the relationship between compliance with recommen- 
dations on the audit committee of the Unified Code and financial reporting quality. 
We conduct the empirical analysis with a sample of Spanish listed companies for the 
years between 2007 and 2013, and use two proxies for financial reporting quality: 
discretionary accruals and the opinion of the audit report. 
In anticipation of the results, we find a strong and positive association of the level 
of compliance with recommendations with the quality of financial reports. This result 
seems robust as it holds for both proxies of financial reporting quality. Moreo- ver, in 
the study conducted at the individual recommendations level we observe sig- nificant 
effects for some specific recommendations. Therefore, we should conclude that 
compliance with recommendations seems to provide a feasible and reliable indi- cator 
of the quality of financial reports. 
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. The next section summarizes 
the main features of the Unified Code. Next, section three reviews the related litera- 
ture and develops the hypotheses of this research. The design of the empirical analy- 
sis is presented in section four. In section five we discuss the results and, in the last 
section, conclusions are drawn. 
 
2 The spanish unified code 
The first Spanish CGP was approved in February 1998 in response to the social 
demand for more efficiency, agility and transparency from the companies (Rodri- 
guez-Fernandez 2016). Officially named Spanish Code of Best Practices, was usu- 
ally known as the Olivencia Code. It contained 23 recommendations on responsi- 
bilities, structure and organization of the board of directors. As in other countries, 
compliance with the recommendations was purely voluntarily. Later on, in 2002,  the 
Aldama Commission was created in order to assess the level of compliance of the 
Olivencia Code and to propose provisions to enhance transparency and secu- rity in 
the stock market. In 2003, the Commission released the so-called Aldama Report, 
which concluded that good practice in corporate governance should remain in  the  
self-regulation  sphere,  subject  to  the  “comply  or  explain”  approach  but 
 
 
complemented by certain mandatory rules2 (CNMV 2004). Following the Aldama 
Report, a number of corporate governance rules found their way into legislation. 
In 2003 the Spanish Government required the CNMV to draft a single docu-  ment 
on good corporate governance practices that would consolidate the contents of both, 
the Olivencia Code and the Aldama Report. The result was the Unified Code released 
in May 2006. It includes 58 recommendations classified into five main areas: 
company bylaws and general shareholders’ meetings (six recommendations); 
structure and operation of the board of directors (20 recommendations); directors 
(eight recommendations); remuneration of directors and senior officers (seven rec- 
ommendations) and committees (17  recommendations).  Following  the  approval of 
the Unified Code, listed companies have to take these 58 recommendations as 
benchmarks. According to the 2012 report of the (CNMV 2012), companies were 
compliant, on average, with 81 percent of the recommendations. In 2015 the CNMV 
published a reform of the Unified Code (CNMV 2015) which, among other changes, 
expands the powers of the audit committee. 
According to the aim of this paper, the focus on the following recommendations: 
#46 (on the accounting background of the members of the audit committee), #47 (on 
the internal audit function supervised by the audit committee), #48 (on the head of 
internal audit presenting the annual work program to the audit committee), #49 (on 
the minimum content of the control and risk management policy), #50 (on the role of 
the audit committee), #51 (on the powers of the audit committee), #52 (on the 
information to be prepared by the audit committee) and #53 (on the board of direc- 
tors aiming to present the annual accounts with an unqualified audit report). We pro- 
vide the exact definition of each recommendation in the Appendix. 
As they are defined in the Unified Code, compliance with some of these recom- 
mendations is rather subjective. For example, recommendation #46 advocates the 
members of the audit committee to be appointed based on their accounting back- 
ground, yet without further developing which accounting background is considered 
as suitable. Similarly, recommendation #53 requires that the board of directors seek 
to obtain an unqualified audit report. Not surprisingly, both recommendations show 
100 percent level of compliance in our sample, as Table 1 shows. On the other hand, 
more objective recommendations (#47, #48 and #50) show the lowest levels of com- 
pliance, while recommendations #49, #51 and #52 show levels of compliance above 
90 percent. The average level of compliance of these recommendation is 90 percent, 









2 Regarding core duties of transparency and disclosure in corporate governance matters, the definition 
and regulation of directors’ duties of loyalty and diligence and the obligation of listed companies to draw 
up corporate governance provisions regarding the operation of their board of directors and sharehold- 
ers’ meetings (CNMV 2004, p. 7). 
 
 
Background and hypotheses development 
The linkage between corporate governance and financial reporting quality seems 
rather straightforward. Weak governance structures and practices offer opportuni- 
ties for managers to engage in opportunistic behaviour, eventually leading to lower 
accounting quality (Gonzalez and Garcia-Meca 2014). As posed by Wang (2006), the 
extant research has extensively documented that higher financial reporting qual- ity 
is associated with stronger corporate governance mechanisms. Hence, Park and Shin 
(2004), Rahman and Ali (2006), Patelli and Prencipe (2007) and Chen and Zhang 
(2014), among others, reported a significant relationship between some char- 
acteristics of the board of directors and the quality of financial statements. 
Focussing specifically on the audit committee, and following our discussion in the 
introduction, a number of studies have investigated whether financial reporting 
quality has improved as a result of the requirements on the audit committee estab- 
lished by the SOX Act. According to DeFond and Zhang (2014) there is broad based 
evidence that independence and expertise of the audit committee are associated with 
stronger financial reporting quality (e.g., Klein 2002 and Bedard et al. 2004). In the 
same line, the independence and financial expertise of the audit committee exhibit   a 
significant and negative association with the occurrence of restatements (Abbott  et 
al. 2004) and also make the incidence of internal control problems less likely 
(Krishnan 2005). 
As for the Spanish market, the available evidence so far does not consistently sup- 
port a positive impact of the audit committee on financial reporting quality. Hence, 
while Sierra et al. (2012) found a negative association between the size and num- ber 
of meetings of the audit committee and financial reporting quality as measured by 
discretionary accruals, Monterrey and Sanchez (2008) did not observe any sig- 
nificant relationship between any characteristic of the audit committee (size, inde- 
pendence and number of meetings) and discretionary accruals. On the other hand, 
Pucheta et al. (2007) and De Andres et al. (2013) studied the impact of audit com- 
mittee characteristics on the opinion of the audit report. Pucheta et al. (2007) con- 
cluded that audit committees in Spain have been only partially effective in guar- 
anteeing higher levels of financial reporting quality and De Andres et al. (2013) 
 
 
observed that while the number of meetings of the audit committee was associated 
with a lower likelihood of modified opinions (higher financial reporting quality), its 
composition (executive/independent directors) was not. 
We expect a positive and significant relationship between the level of compliance 
with the recommendations on the audit committee of the Unified Code (recommen- 
dations #47 to #52) and the quality of financial reporting. We base this expecta-  tion 
on the fact that these recommendations aim to enforce the levels of competence and 
independence of the audit committee, and on prior research generally showing  a 
positive relationship between better functioning audit committees and financial 
reporting quality. Accordingly, we pose the hypotheses of this research as follows: 
Hypothesis 1 There is a positive and significant association between the level of 
compliance with recommendations on the audit committee and financial reporting 
quality. 
In addition to hypothesis 1 which refers to the global compliance of recommen- 
dations, we also pose six additional hypotheses (1a to 1f) adressing the compliance 
with each specific recommendation. Hence, Hypothesis 1a states: compliance with 
recommendation #47 is positively and significantly associated with financial report- 
ing quality.3 
 
3 Research design and sample selection 
3.1 Research design 
First, we present the design of the main analysis conducted with discretionary accru- 
als as the proxy of financial reporting quality and afterwards the analysis with the 
opinion of the audit report. 
3.1.1 Discretionary accruals 
 
Following prior research (e.g., Myers et al. 2003), we proxy financial reporting 
quality with discretionary accruals. Hence, higher levels of accruals would indicate 
higher management discretion to manipulate earnings and, therefore, lower account- 
ing quality. In Eq. (1) below, we show our model to compute discretionary accruals 


















3 Hypotheses 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, 1e and 1f refer to recommendations # 47, 48, 49, 50, 51 and 52 respectively. 
 
 
TAt Is total accruals in year t; 
ΔREVt Is revenues in year t less revenues in year t−1; 
ΔRECt Is net receivables in year t less net receivables in year t−1; 
PPEt Is gross property plant and equipment at the end of year t; 
At−1 Is total assets at the end of year t−1; 
α1, α2 and α3    Are the parameters to be estimated; and 
εt Is the error term 
Instead of the usual cross-sectional estimations of Eq. (1) at the industry level, due 
to a relatively too low number of firms in some industries we follow the approach 
suggested by Mora and Sabater (2008) of industry-panel estimations of Eq. (1) with 
firm and year specific fixed effects. After obtaining discretionary accru- als from the 
estimation of Eq. (1), and according to the aim of this paper, we esti- mate the model 
given by Eq. (2) below, with the absolute value of discretionary accruals as the 
dependent variable. Among the independent variables, our variable of interest 
(COMPLIANCE) accounts for the level of compliance with the recom- mendations 
on the audit committee observed by the company and we also include the typical 
control variables used in prior related research (e.g., Myers et al. 2003, Carey and 
Simnett 2006 and Francis and Wang 2008). 
ABSDAi,t = /30 + /31COMPLIANCEi,t−1 + /32SIZEi,t + /33AGEi,t + /34LEVERAGEi,t 
+ /34GROWTHi,t + /35LLOSSi,t + /36CFFOi,t + /37AUDFIRMi,t 




ABSDA: discretionary accruals obtained as the absolute value of residuals from 
the estimation of Eq. (1). 
Experimental variable 
COMPLIANCE: the number of recommendations (from #48 to #52) observed by 
the company divided by the number of applicable recommendations.4 
Control variables 
SIZE: natural logarithm of total assets; 
AGE: natural logarithm of the number of years the client has been listed by the 
supervisor of the Spanish stock market; 
LEVERAGE: total liabilities divided by total assets; 
GROWTH: change in total assets from prior year; 
LLOSS: a dichotomous variable which takes the value of 1 if the company has 
negative net income in the last two years and 0 otherwise; 
 
 
4 Although the Unified Code allows partial compliance of the recommendations, similar to other papers 
(e.g., Chen et al. 2007 and Sanchez et al. 2012) we only consider full compliance. Thus, partial compli- 
ance is assimilated to non-compliance. 
 
 
CFFO: cash flow from operations scaled over total assets; 
AUDFIRM: a dichotomous variable which takes the value of 1 if the firm is 
audited by a Big 4 auditor and 0 otherwise. 
Our variable of interest COMPLIANCE is defined as one-year lagged in the main 
analysis, as we expect that current accounting practices will impact next year’s 
accounting quality. However, as the impact of compliance on financial reporting 
quality might also occur on a current-year basis, we also include the variable in cur- 
rent-year terms (COMPLIANCEc). Moreover, to assess the robustness of the results 
to alternative measures of this variable, we conduct additional analyses with FULL- 
COMPLIANCE (1 if the firm complies with all the recommendations and 0 other- 
wise) and FULLCOMPLIANCEc (FULLCOMPLIANCE in current-year terms). 
Next, we justify our choice of control variables in Eq. (2). We expect larger firms 
(SIZE) to show higher accounting quality (e.g., Watts and Zimmerman 1986 and 
Myers et al. 2003). AGE aims to control for differences in accruals through the life 
cycle (e.g., Anthony and Ramesh 1992 and Myers et al. 2003). Following Becker   et 
al. (1998), among others, highly leveraged firms (LEVERAGE) face stronger 
incentives to manipulate earnings to avoid debt covenant violation. GROWTH is 
included because accruals are likely to be associated with growth opportunities  (e.g., 
Johnson et al. 2002 and Carey and Simnett 2006). LLOSS accounts for a higher 
likelihood of earnings management by companies with losses (Carey and Simnett 
2006). We include CFFO because accruals and cash flows tend to be negatively cor- 
related on average (e.g., Dechow 1994 and Sloan 1996). Finally, we expect Big 4 audit 
firms (AUDFIRM) to be more conservative and thus more willing to limit the use of 
discretionary accruals for earning management purposes (e.g., Becker et al. 1998 and 
Francis et al. 1999). 
3.1.2 The opinion of the audit report 
 
The opinion of the audit report provides another usual proxy for accounting qual- ity. 
External auditors play a fundamental role in the classical corporate governance 
scheme, as they certify the quality of financial statements. In the audit report, the 
external auditor, who is supposed to be both competent and independent, releases 
her/his opinion on the financial statements of the client. An unqualified opinion 
indicates that, in the auditor’s view, financial statements fairly present the current 
situation of the firm. Conversely, modified opinion(s) in the audit report shows that 
the financial statements do not fully represent the current and fair situation of the 
firm.5 Hence, investors and any potential stakeholder of the firm can use the opinion 
of the audit report as an indicator of the quality of the firm’s accounting informa- 





5 The level of disagreement of the auditor with the financial statements of the company will depend on 
the number and importance of the modified opinions. 
 
 
committee is positively and significantly associated with financial reporting quality, 
the likelihood of a modified opinion should be lower for these companies..6 
Similar to prior studies (e.g., Chi and Chin 2011) we consider audit reports with 
either qualified, unfavourable, disclaimer of opinion, or with explanatory paragraphs 
expressing doubts about the future of the company, collectively as qualified reports. 
To test the relationship between compliance with recommendations and the opinion 
of the audit report, we propose the logistic model given by Eq. (3) below, with MAO 
(defined as 1 if the client receives a qualified audit report and 0 otherwise) as the 
dependent variable, our variable of interest COMPLIANCE and the usual control 
variables. 
MAOi,t = 1J0 + 1J1COMPLIANCEi,t + 1J2SIZEi,t + 1J3AGEi,t + 1J4LEVERAGEi,t 
+ 1J6LLOSSi,t + 1J7AUDFIRMi,t + 1J8ZMIJWi,t + 1J9CACLi,tt 
+      Industry dummiesi,t + ).Year dummiesi,t + Bi,t (3) 
 
Control variables in Eq. (3) attempt to capture the main determinants of the auditor’s 
opinion, and are basically related to the risk of litigation faced by the auditor when 
auditing a client. In addition to the control variables already used in the analysis 
conducted with discretionary accruals7 (SIZE, AGE, LEVERAGE, LLOSS and AUD- 
FIRM), we also include ZMIJW (the adjusted Zmijewski’s 1984 score) and CACL 
(current assets over current liabilities). 
Next, we discuss the control variables in Eq. (3). The size of the client might affect 
the auditor’s propensity to issue a modified audit opinion. First, as the higher risk of 
litigation associated with large clients (Lys and Watts 1994; Shu 2000) could make 
auditors more willing to issue a modified opinion. However, large companies have 
also more negotiating power with the audit firm to avoid a qualified report. Therefore, 
we do not predict the sign of the coefficient of SIZE. AGE accounts for the higher 
likelihood of financial distress (and litigation risk for the audit firm) of companies 
with a short listing history (Dopuch et al. 1987; Chi and Chin 2011).    As in Carey 
and Simnett (2006), among others, AUDFIRM intends to capture the higher 
propensity of Big 4 auditors to issue modified audit opinions. The remaining 
variables (LEVERAGE, ZMIJW, LLOSS and CACL) are indicators of financial health 
which account for the litigation risk of the auditor. Hence, higher financial lever-  age 
(LEVERAGE) makes bankruptcy more likely and consequently raises litigation risk. 
The Zmijewski score (ZMIJW) is a usual proxy of the probability of bankruptcy 
(Krishnan and Krishnan 1997; Carey and Simnett 2006). Following Chi and Chin 
(2011), we include LLOSS to complement ZMIJW, which accounts only for the cur- 




6  While a modified opinion in the audit report provides a clear indicator of poor accounting quality, at  the 
same time it might also provide an indicator of high audit quality, as it can be interpreted as a prove of 
auditor independence. 
7 However,  we include neither GROWTH nor CFFO, as both variables are expected to be associated  with 
the level of discretionary accruals but not with the opinion of the audit report. 
 
 
negative earnings. Previous studies have shown that firms with losses face higher 
probabilities of modified audit opinions (Dopuch et al. 1987). Conversely, higher 
levels of liquidity (CACL) should make modified opinions less likely. Therefore, we 
expect positive coefficients for LEVERAGE, ZMIJW and LLOSS and a negative coef- 
ficient for CACL. 
 
4.2  Sample selection 
Our sample consists of non-financial companies listed in the Spanish Stock Exchange 
(Sistema de Interconexión Bursátil Español) for the years between 2007 and 2013. 
The election of the research period is due to the fact that 2007 is the first year for 
which we have  declarations of compliance with the recommendations of  the Unified 
Code. On the other hand, 2012 was the last year covered by the CNMV reports on 
the level of compliance of the Unified Code. Therefore, we are able to compute the 
experimental variable COMPLIANCE for each year of the 2007–2012 period. Since 
in the main analysis the experimental variable is defined as one-year lagged, all the 
variables in Eqs. (2) and (3) refer to the years between 2008 and 2013, with the 
exception of COMPLIANCE which refers to the years between 2007 and 2012. In the 
estimation with current-year compliance (COMPLIANCEc) all var- iables refer to the 
years between 2008 and 2012. 
The sample initially consisted of 101 firms and, given the six-year research period, 
of a maximum of 606 firm-year observations. However, due of lack of data, in the 
analysis conducted with discretionary accruals we lost 52 observations, and 64 firm-
year observations in the analysis with the opinion of the audit report. Hence, the final 
sample consists of 554 firm-year observations in the model with discretion- ary 
accruals and of 542 in the model with the opinion of the audit report. Moreo- ver, in 
the estimation with compliance in current-year terms we lost all the observa- tions 
for the year 2007, and therefore the analyses with discretionary accruals and the 
opinion of the audit report are estimated with samples of 466 and 462 firm-year 
observations, respectively. 
Table 2 shows some descriptive statistics  for  the  independent  variables  in  Eqs. 
(2) and (3). The most interesting point has to do with the experimental vari- able 
COMPLIANCE, which shows an average of 0.9 (90 percent of compliance with the 
accounting recommendations) with a minimum of 0.37. Results also show an extreme 
level of concentration (91 percent) of the Spanish audit market by Big-4 firms. 
Table 3 displays Pearson correlation coefficients between each pair of variables in 
Eq. (2). The correlation pattern for the dependent variable (ABSDA) strongly meets 
our expectations. Hence, discretionary accruals are positively and significantly cor- 
related with LEVERAGE, GROWTH and LLOSS and negatively and significantly 
correlated with SIZE, AGE, CFFO and AUDFIRM. However, we do not observe any 
significant relationship with our variable of interest COMPLIANCE. Thus, accord- 
ing with Table 3, higher compliance of does not seem to be associated with higher 
accounting quality. The Table reveals some other interesting features, such as the 
positive and significant correlation between COMPLIANCE and AUDFIRM, which 
indicates higher levels of compliance for  those firms audited by Big-4 auditors      or 
the fact that larger firms generally show higher compliance. The relatively low 
 
 
correlations for each pair of independent variables (the maximum value is 0.35) do 
not suggest multicollinearity problems in the data. However, after the estimation of 
Eq. (2) we compute variance inflation factors. The relatively low values of these fac- 
tors (mean value of 1.23, with a maximum of 1.43 for LLOSS) support or view that 
multicollinearity should not seriously affect our results. 
 
 
4 Empirical results 
4.1 Discretionary accruals 
Before the estimation of Eq. (2) we conduct a preliminary univariate analysis to 
assess the relationship between compliance with recommendations and discretion- 
ary accruals. First, we differentiate between firms which comply with all recom- 
mendations and the rest, and then we carry out a similar analysis for each specific 
recommendation. After defining the different subsamples, we compute mean and 
median values of discretionary accruals across subsamples and conduct both the t test 
of differences of means and the Mann–Whitney test of differences of medians to 
assess about the statistical significance of these differences. Table 4 summarizes the 
results of the univariate analysis. The main result is that firms that comply with all 
recommendations present significantly lower mean and median discretionary accru- 
als. When recommendations are individually taken, we observe significance with 
both the t-test and Mann-Witney test for recommendations #48 and #50, while for 
recommendation #47 significance is reported only for median accruals. In all cases 
the sign of these differences is as predicted, discretionary accruals being smaller for 
those firms complying with the recommendation. Therefore, the results of the uni- 
variate analysis suggest a positive and significant relationship between compliance 
and financial reporting quality. 
After the preliminary univariate analysis, Table 5 displays the results of the four 
estimations of Eq. (2). Columns A and B shows the estimates of the models with one-
year lagged compliance (COMPLIANCE) and current-year compliance (COM- 
PLIANCEc), respectively. Then, columns C and D show the results with the dichoto- 
mous versions of compliance (FULLCOMPLIANCE in column C and FULLCOM- 
PLIANCEc in column D). In keeping with the panel structure of the dataset, we    use 
panel data models for the estimations. As the modified Wald test confirms the 
expected heteroscedasticity in the data and we also observe significant correlation in 
the error term, estimations are performed with generalized least squares correcting 
for heteroscedasticity and correlation. Moreover, to avoid the negative effects of out- 
liers, all continuous variables are winsorized to the top and bottom one percent. All 
four estimations are globally significant at the usual levels (P-value < 0.00). 
The most interesting result in Table 5 is the negative and significant coefficients 
of our variable of interest, in all the estimations (COMPLIANCE, COMPLIANCEc, 
FULLCOMPLIANCE and FULLCOMPLIANCEc). Hence, results provide sound and 
consistent support for  a negative relationship between the level of compli-  ance with 




discretionary accruals, and therefore, support Hypothesis 1 which states that compli- 
ance will be positively and significantly associated with financial reporting quality. 
Additionally, the results of the multivariate analysis are consistent with the univari- 
ate analysis displayed in Table 4 which had already anticipated a direct relationship 
between compliance and financial reporting quality. 
Given that the recommendations examined here are focused on the functioning  of 
the audit committee, our results indicate that companies with better functioning audit 
committees present higher accounting quality. It should be noted that, unlike 
international evidence which generally agrees on a relevant role of the audit com- 
mittee (e.g., Abbott and Parker 2000 and Bedard et al. 2004), prior evidence for Spain 
had been rather mixed. Hence, while Sierra et al. (2012) concluded that bet- ter 
functioning audit committees were associated with lower discretionary accruals, 
Monterrey and Sanchez (2008) did not reported significant results. Therefore, our 
results would be more in line with the international evidence than with prior studies 
for Spain. 
As for the control variables, we report significant results for most  of  them (SIZE, 
AGE, LEVERAGE, LLOSS, CFFO and AUDFIRM). With the only exception of 
CFFO, in all these cases the sign of the coefficient is as predicted. Hence, we 
observe lower discretionary accruals (higher financial reporting quality) for 
larger (SIZE) and well-established firms (AGE), and also for firms with Big 4 
auditors (AUDFIRM). Also meeting our expectations, high levels of financial 
leverage (LEV- ERAGE) or losses (LLOSS) are also associated with higher 
levels of discretionary accruals (lower financial reporting quality).We have 
performed two robustness checks. First, we reestimate Eq. (2) with the signed 
value of discretionary accruals instead of the absolute value as the dependent 
variable. We used the absolute value of discretionary accruals to make our 
results more comparable with prior related studies, particularly with those 
conducted with samples of Spanish companies (Monterrey and Sanchez 2008 
and Sierra et al.  2012). However, in the estimations conducted with signed 
discretionary accruals,  we do not observe any significant relationship 
between compliance with recom- mendations and financial reporting quality 
(results not reported). Secondly, Trom- betta and Imperatore (2014) argued 
that the dynamic of financial crises might lead non-monotonic effects on 
earnings quality. Hence, earnings management decreases when the intensity 
of the crisis is low, while it increases when the crisis is acute. As our research 
period includes the years of the recent economic downturn in Spain,  we have 
considered important to control for this fact. Accordingly, we reestimate Eq. 
(2) with the new variable CRISIS, defined as 1 for the years 2009, 2010 and 
2012 (the worst years of the crisis) and 0 otherwise, substituting the year 
controls. Results (not reported) are qualitatively the same as those in Table 5. 
Next, we present and discuss the results of the analysis conducted at the level of 
individual recommendations. We defined six dichotomous variables (one for each of 
the following recommendations: #47, #48, #49, #50, #51 and #52) indicating com- 
pliance or not with each recommendation. Next, we perform sequential estimations 
 
 
of Eq. (2), one for each new variable. Results of the new estimations, in Table 6 are 
consistent with those in Table 5 supporting a positive and significant relationship 
between compliance with recommendations and financial reporting quality. Hence, 
we report significant results for recommendations #47 (listed companies should have 
an internal audit function, under the supervision of the audit committee), #48 (the 
head of internal audit should present an annual work program to the audit commit- 
tee) and #50 (on the specific functions of the audit committee). In all three cases,  the 
sign of the coefficient is negative as predicted. Therefore, compliance with each of 
these specific recommendations is associated with lower levels of discretionary 
accruals (higher financial reporting quality). Conversely, we do not report significant 
results for recommendations #49 (about control and risk management policy), #51 
(the audit committee should be empowered to meet with any company employee or 
manager) or #52 (on the reporting of the audit committee on various points). Sum- 
ming up, results provide support for Hypotheses 1a, 1b and 1d. It should be noted 
however, that recommendations #49, #51 and #52 show the highest levels of compli- 
ance in our sample, in all cases above 90 percent. Therefore, the low variability of 
the experimental variables in these cases might have likely contributed to explain  the 
lack of significant effects for these variables. 
 
4.2 The opinion of the audit report 
We estimate Eq. (3) with a panel data logistic model with random effects. Results are 
shown in Table 7. The log-likelihood ratio test (not reported) advocates the use of a 
panel data approach over the alternative pooled logistic estimations. Moreo-  ver,  all  
four  estimations  in  Table  7  are  globally  significant  at  the  usual levels (P-value 
< 0.00). The main result is the negative and statistically significant coef- ficients of 
the variable of interest in all four estimations. Hence, compliance is negatively and 
significantly associated with the likelihood of a modified opinion in the audit report, 
and therefore, positively and significantly associated with finan- cial reporting 
quality. As in the analysis conducted with discretionary accruals, the fact that the 
same result holds independently on how the experimental variable in introduced in 
the model (in current or lagged terms or as a continuous or discrete variable) offers a 
proof of robustness. Accordingly, similar to the analysis con- ducted with 
discretionary accruals, these results provide consistent support for our Hypothesis 1 
of a positive and significant relationship between compliance with the accounting 
recommendations and financial reporting quality. 
Results for control variables strongly meet our expectations, as whenever a sig- 
nificant result is observed it is always in the predicted direction. Hence, modified 
opinions are strongly associated with the firm’s financial condition. We report sig- 
nificant results for financial leverage (LEVERAGE), the reporting of losses (LLOSS), 
the probability of bankruptcy (ZMIJW) and the level of liquidity (CACL). We also 
observe that a modified opinion is less likely for large than for small firms. We had 
not predicted the sign of the coefficient of SIZE, as larger firms involve higher risk of 
litigation for the auditor (and consequently higher likelihood of a qualified opin- ion), 
though these firms also have more negotiating power to avoid an audit qualifi- cation 
in the audit report. 
We have also addressed the relationship between compliance with each specific 
 
 
recommendation and the likelihood of a modified opinion. The results of the new set 
of estimations of Eq. (3) with the experimental variables REC47, REC48, REC49, 
REC50, REC51 and REC52 are shown in Table 8. All six estimations are globally 
significant at the usual levels (P-value < 0.00). We  observe significant results for  the 
variables REC47 and REC48 (P-value < 0.10), in both cases with the predicted 
negative sign. Moreover, for REC50 results are on the edge of marginal significance. 
These results are rather consistent with those in Table 6, which also displayed sig- 
nificant coefficients for REC47, REC48 and REC50 and support the main conclusion 
in Table 7 of a significant relationship between compliance with the code and the 
opinion of the audit report. 
 
5 Concluding remarks 
With the aim of enhancing financial reporting quality, the SOX Act in the US and 
similar regulations in other countries mandated changes in the audit committee. 
Numerous studies since then have investigated whether these requirements have  been 
effective. However, in addition to this “hard” legislation approach to corporate 
governance, regulators have also adopted a “soft” approach based on codes of good 
practices. Some of the recommendations of these codes refer to the audit committee. 
We extend the literature on the effectiveness of the audit committee by investigating 
the relationship between compliance with recommendations on the audit committee 
and financial reporting quality. 
The main result of this research is that there exists a strong and positive relation- 
ship between the level of compliance with the recommendations on the audit com- 
mittee of the Spanish Unified Code and the quality of financial reporting. This result 
seems robust as it holds across various checks. Additionally, results observed at the 
level of individual recommendations support the main conclusion that compliance is 
associated with higher financial reporting quality. Therefore, while extant evidence 
for Spain does not consistently support the view that the audit committee plays a 
significant role in guaranteeing financial reporting quality, the results we report  
aremore in line with international evidence. Given the generally high levels of 
compli- ance in our sample, the likelihood of reporting significant results for our 
variables of interest was relatively low. Thus, the fact that we report a strong and 
consistent rela- tionship between compliance and financial reporting quality in such a 
context can be taken as another proof of the robustness of the results. 
There is an open debate about the pros and cons of the different regulatory 
approaches to corporate governance. Some authors have questioned the very effec- 
tiveness of codes of good practices, based on the “comply or explain” principle, to 
effectively enhance corporate governance structures and practices. This study con- 
tributes to the debate. According to our results, codes of good practices might be a 
suitable tool in order to strengthen governance structures and practices. At a more 
practical level and focusing specifically on the accounting and auditing fields, results 
might have some interesting implications, as investors, market participants and, in 
general, any potential user of financial reports can take the level of compliance with 
recommendations as a feasible and reliable indicator of the quality of the accounting 
information released by the company. 
This research might be extended in several ways. First, by examining the relation- 
 
 
ship between compliance with recommendations other than those affecting the audit 
committee of codes of good practices and financial reporting quality. Secondly, it 
would also be interesting to address the relationship between compliance with rec- 
ommendations (not only with recommendations on the audit committee) and more 
general indicators of governance, such as different metrics of performance. 
 
 
Appendix. Recommendations of accounting content (# 46–53) 
in the Spanish Unified Code (CNMV 2006) 
46. All members of the Audit Committee, particularly its chairman, should be 
appointed with regard to their knowledge and background in accounting, auditing and 
risk management matters. 
47. Listed companies should have an internal audit function, under the supervision of 
the Audit Committee, to ensure the proper operation of internal reporting and control 
systems. 
48. The head of internal audit should present an annual work program to the Audit 
Committee; report to it directly on any incidents arising during its implementation; 
and submit an activities report at the end of the year. 
49. Control and risk management policy shall specify at least: 
(a) The different types of risk (operational, technological, financial, legal, repu- 
tational…) the company is exposed to, with the inclusion under financial or 
economic risks of contingent liabilities and other off-balance-sheet risks; 
(b) The determination of the risk level the company sees as acceptable; 
(c) Measures in place to mitigate the impact of risk events should they occur; 
50. The internal reporting and control systems to be used to control and manage the 
above risks, including contingent liabilities and off-balance-sheet risks.The 
Audit Committee’s role will  be: 
1. With respect to internal control and reporting systems: 
(a) Monitor the preparation and the integrity of the financial information pre- 
pared on the company and, where appropriate, the group, checking for 
compliance with legal provisions and the correct application of accounting 
principles. 
(b) Review internal control and risk management systems on a regular basis, 
so main risks are properly identified, managed and disclosed. 
(c) Oversee the independence and effectiveness of the internal audit function; 
propose the selection, appointment, reappointment and removal of the head 
of internal audit; propose the resources to be assigned to the internal audit 
function; receive regular report backs on its activities; and verify that sen- 
ior management are acting on the conclusions and recommendations of its 
reports. 
(d) Establish and supervise a mechanism whereby staff can report any irregu- 




2. With respect to the external auditor: 
(a) Make recommendations to the Board for the selection, appointment, reap- 
pointment and removal of the external auditor, and the terms and conditions 
of his engagement. 
(b) Receive regular information from the external auditor on the progress and 
findings of the audit program, and check that senior management are acting 
on its recommendations. 
(c) Oversee the independence of the external auditor, to which end: (i) The 
company will notify any change of auditor to the CNMV as a significant 
event, stating the reasons for its decision. (ii) The Committee will ensure 
that the company and the auditor adhere to current regulations on the provi- 
sion of non-audit services, the limits on the concentration of the auditor’s 
business and, in general, other requirements designed to safeguard auditors’ 
independence; iii) The Committee should investigate the issues giving rise 
to the resignation of any external auditor. 
(d) In case of groups, the Committee should urge the group auditor to take on 
the auditing of all component companies. 
51. The Audit Committee should be empowered to meet with any company 
employee or manager, even ordering their appearance without the presence of 
another senior officer. 
(a) The Audit Committee will report on the following points from Recommenda- 
tion 8 before Board  decision-making:The financial information that listed 
companies must periodically disclose. The Committee shall ensure that 
intermediate statements are drawn up under the same accounting principles as 
the annual statements and, to this end, may ask the external auditor to conduct a 
limited review. 
(b) The creation or acquisition of shares in special purpose vehicles or entities resi- 
dent in countries or territories considered tax havens, and any other transactions 
or operations of a comparable nature whose complexity might impair the trans- 
parency of the group. 
(c) Related-party transactions, except where their scrutiny has been entrusted to 
some other supervision and control committee. 
52. The Board of Directors shall seek to present the annual accounts to the Gen-  eral 
Shareholders’ Meeting without reservations or qualifications in the audit report. 
Should such reservations or qualifications exist, both the Chairman of the Audit 
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Table 1  Level of compliance 
with the accounting 
recommendations of the 
Spanish Unified Code in our 









Recommendation #   Compliance (%) 
 
    

















Table 2  Descriptive statistics for the independent variables   
 
Variable Mean Median    SDMinimum    Maximum 
  
 
SIZE 6.84 6.66 1.77 3.42 11.51 
AGE (in years) 16.47 19 7.09 2.00 27.00 
LEVERAGE 0.67 0.66 0.24 0.14 1.72 
GROWTH 1.16 1.05 0.78 0.29 7.53 
LLOSS 0.21 0.00 0.41 0.00 1.00 
CFFO 0.06 0.06 0.10 -0.29 0.38 
AUDFIRM 0.91 1.00 0.29 0.00 1.00 
ZMIJW − 2.07 − 1.98 1.60 − 5.92 1.16 
CACL 1.44 1.18 1.28 0.08 20.00 
COMPLIANCE 0.90 1.00 0.15 0.37 1.00 
SIZE natural logarithm of total assets, AGE number of years the cli- 
ent has been listed in the Spanish stock market, LEVERAGE total 
liabilities divided by total assets, GROWTH: change in total assets 
from prior year, LLOSS 1 if the company has negative net income in 
the last two years and 0 otherwise, CFFO cash flow from operations 
scaled over total assets, AUDFIRM 1 if the audit firm is a Big 4 audi- 
tor and 0 otherwise, ZMIJW the probability of bankruptcy, CACL 
current assets divided by current liabilities, COMPLIANCE number 
of accounting recommendations observed by the company in year t−1 





Table 3 Pearson correlations and levels of significance between pairs of variables in the analysis con- 
ducted with discretionary accruals 
ABSDA SIZE AGE LEVER- 
AGE 
GROWTH     LLOSS CFFO AUDFIRM 
 
 
SIZE − 0.14*** 
AGE − 0.14***    0.13*** 
LEVER- 
AGE 
0.11*** 0.26*** 0.02 
GROWTH 0.33*** − 0.04 − 0.20***     − 0.03 
LLOSS 0.08** − 012*** − 0.00 0.34*** − 0.14*** 
CFFO − 0.25***    0.12*** − 0.04 − 0.14***    − 0.07** − 0.26*** 
AUDFIRM    − 0.23***    0.20*** − 0.05 − 0.14***     − 0.10***     − 0.15***    0.14*** 
COMPLI- 
ANCE 





ABSDA discretionary accruals in absolute values, SIZE: natural logarithm of total assets, AGE 
natural logarithm of the number of years the client has been listed in the Spanish stock market, 
LEVERAGE   total liabilities divided by total assets, GROWTH change in total assets from 
prior year, LLOSS 1 if the company has negative net income in the last two years and 0 
otherwise, CFFO cash flow from operations scaled over total assets, AUDFIRM 1 if the audit 
firm is a Big 4 auditor and 0 otherwise, COMPLIANCE number of accounting 
recommendations observed by the company in year t−1 divided by the number of applicable 
recommendations 








Mean Sign. Median Sign. 
Table 4  Univariate analysis of 
differences of mean and median    
discretionary accruals by 













The t-test (Mann–Whitney test) is used for assessing the significance 
of mean (median) accruals 
Full Compliance compliance with all the accounting recommenda- 
tions (from #47 to #52), Rec47 compliance with recommendation 
#47, Rec48 compliance with recommendation #48, Rec49 compli- 
ance with recommendation #49, Rec50 compliance with recommen- 
dation #50, Rec51 compliance with recommendation #51, Rec52:  
compliance with recommendation #52 




Full Compliance Yes 0.051 ** 0.032 *** 
 No 0.063  0.043  
Rec47 Yes 0.055  0.033 *** 
 No 0.069  0.054  
Rec48 Yes 0.055 ** 0.032 *** 
 No 0.068  0.053  
Rec49 Yes 0.057  0.036  
 No 0.069  0.033  
Rec50 Yes 0.052 * 0.032 *** 
 No 0.074  0.049  
Rec51 Yes 0.044  0.035  
 No 0.058  0.040  
Rec52 Yes 0.055  0.034  
 No 0.080  0.049  
 
 
Table 5 Results of the multivariate analysis (I). The relationship between the level of compliance with 
accounting recommendations and discretionary accruals 
Variable Predicted sign   Column A Column B Column C Column D 
 
COMPLIANCE -(Hypothesis)   − 0.028 
(− 3.23)*** 






-(Hypothesis) − 0.007 
(− 2.37)** 
-(Hypothesis) − 0.007 
(− 3.68)*** 
SIZE – − 0.004 
(− 4.23)*** 
AGE – − 0.007 
(− 2.00) ** 
LEVERAGE + 0.061 
(6.42)*** 
GROWTH + 0.006 
(1.19) 
LLOSS + 0.016 
(3.95)*** 
CFFO – 0.064 
(3.68)*** 












































YEAR controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
INDUSTRY con- 
trols 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 






# of observations 
Pseudo R2 


















Table 8    Additional results (II). The relationship between compliance with individual recommendations and the opinion of the audit report 
Variable Predicted sign Column A Column B Column C Column D Column E Column F 
 
REC47 -(Hypothesis) − 1.09 (− 
1.68)* 
REC48 -(Hypothesis) − 0.99 (− 
1.68)* 
REC49 -(Hypothesis) 1.15 
(0.68) 
REC50 -(Hypothesis) − 0.92 
(− 1.54) 
REC51 -(Hypothesis) 0.49 
(− 0.32) 
REC52 -(Hypothesis) − 0.60 
(− 0.68) 
SIZE ± − 1.08 
(− 3.78)*** 
AGE − − 0.41 
(− 0.60) 
LEVERAGE + 3.65 
(2.03)** 
LLOSS + 1.10 
(1.99)** 
AUDFIRM + − 1.15 
(− 1.31) 
ZMIJW + 1.21 
(3.17)*** 






































































−  0.64 
(− 1.82)* 
YEAR controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 







Table 6    Additional results (I). The relationship between compliance with individual recommendations and discretionary accruals 
Variable Predicted sign Column A Column B Column C Column D Column E Column F 
 
REC47 -(Hypothesis) − 0.015 
(− 3.49)*** 
REC48 -(Hypothesis) − 0.016 
(− 3.91)*** 
REC49 -(Hypothesis) − 0.000 
(− 0.01) 
REC50 -(Hypothesis) − 0.008 
(− 2.26)** 
REC51 -(Hypothesis) − 0.002 
(− 0.37) 
REC52 -(Hypothesis) − 0.004 
(− 0.82) 
SIZE − − 0.004 
(− 4.29)*** 
AGE − − 0.007 
(− 2.05) ** 
LEVERAGE + 0.063 
(6.55)*** 
GROWTH + 0.007 
(1.38) 
LLOSS + 0.015 
(3.74)*** 
CFFO − 0.008 
(3.82)*** 








































































YEAR controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 











Table 7 Results of the multivariate analysis (II). The relationship between the level of compliance with 
accounting recommendations and the opinion of the audit report 
 
Variable Predicted sign Column A Column B Column C Column D 
COMPLIANCE -(Hypothesis) − 2.98 (− 
1.63)* 
COMPLIANCEc -(Hypothesis) − 5.82 
(− 2.30)** 
FULLCOMPLIANCE -(Hypothesis) − 1.06 
(− 1.96)** 
FULLCOMPLIANCEc -(Hypothesis) − 1.34 
(− 2.28)** 
SIZE ± − 1.09 
(− 3.83)*** 
AGE − − 0.44 
(− 0.65) 
LEVERAGE + 3.51 
(1.96)** 
LLOSS + 1.14 
(2.06)** 
AUDFIRM + − 1.14 
(− 1.29) 
ZMIJW + 1.22 
(3.18)*** 












































YEAR controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 









# of observations 
Wald Chi (2) 
542 
47.06*** 
462 
37.46*** 
542 
46.66*** 
462 
37.03*** 
